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BAR BRIEFS
et al., 191 Minn. 582, 254 N. W. 910 (1934); Dwarken v. Apart-
ment House Owners Association, 38 Ohio App. 265, 176 N. E. 577
(1931); Unger v. Landlord's Management Corporation, 114 N. J.
Eq. 18, 168 A. 229 (1933); Paul v. Stanley, 168 Wash. 371, 12 P.
2nd 401 (1932). Likewise courts have held the practice of
medicine and dentistry, interests which will be protected by in-
junction, although the unlicensed practice is punishable crimin-
ally. Sloan et al v. Mitchell, 113 W. Va. 506, 168 S. E. 800 (1933) ;
Kentucky State Board of Dental Examiners v. Payne, 213 Ky.
302, 281 S. W. 188 (1926). If the right to practice law, medicine,
and dentistry, is an exclusive valuable privilege, exclusive in that
it is restricted to those who, after special training and after ex-
amination and determination of special fitness, are accorded the
right to follow the profession; and valuable in that it is an oppor-
tunity to secure material benefits not given to those outside of
the profession, why, then, is not the right to practice barbering
in the same classification for the same reasons? In the case
under discussion, the court found no legal right threatened, and
it specifically decided that the defendant's conduct sought to be
enjoined did not constitute a public nuisance, that the acts are
"unlawful solely because they are made so by statute." With
licensed barbers being subject to health and sanitation regula-
tions prescribed by the Board of Barber Examiners (Laws 1927,
Chapter 101), the public is somewhat protected against unsani-
tary barber shops. Could not such uninspected and unregulated
barber shops create a danger to public health so as to constitute
a public nuisance? But logical as the above arguments may
sound, by the decision in question, if the State Board of Barbers
Examiner desires injunctive relief, the Act will have to be
amended so as to specifically declare violations a public nuisance.
So confirmed was the court in its decisions that it is to be ob-
served that the plaintiffs case was dismissed without an ap-
pearance by the party defendant.
WILMER D. NEWTON,
Third Year Law Student,
University of North Dakota.
OUR SUPREME COURT HOLDS
In Truman Hart, Respt., v. Charles Rigler, et al., Defts., and Charles
Rigler, Deft. and Applt.
That a party by making a general appearance in an action confers jur-
isdiction over the person of such party which is complete from the date of
such appearance.
That under the provisions of section 7482 of the Compiled Laws, N. D.
1913, a trial court is empowered, "in furtherance of justice and on such terms
as may be proper", to grant a motion amending any pleading "by correcting
a mistake in the name of a party"; and in doing this, the court is given wide
discretionary power.
That even though, on a motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict
or for a new trial, the record may show that there is no evidence to support
the verdict, nevertheless, where it is reasonable to believe that the defects
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in the evidence may be supplied upon a new trial, the motion for judgment
notwithstanding the verdict should be denied, and a new trial ordered in
furtherance of justice.
That a motion for a new trial on the ground of the insufficiency of the
evidence to sustain the verdict is addressed to the sound discretion of the
trial court. Such discretion, however, is a judicial discretion; and where the
record shows that the evidence in support of the verdict is insufficient to
sustain the verdict, such motion should be granted.
That evidence reviewed and it is held: that the plaintiff has failed to
make out a case against the appellant, but defects may be remedied on a re-
trial, and therefore, a new trial is ordered.
Appeal from the District Court of Wells County, Hon. Fred Jansonius,
Judge.
REVERSED: Opinion of the Court by Burr, J.
In Gordon W. LaBree, AppIt., v. Dakota Tractor and Equipment Company,
a corporation, Respt.
That where the trial court grants a new trial because of the unsatis-
factory nature of the evidence, such action will not be reversed unless it is
shown clearly that the discretion of the court has been abused.
Appeal from the District Court of Cass County, Hon. Daniel B. Holt,
Judge.
AFFIRMED: Opinion of the Court 'by Burr, J.
In the Dunham Lumber Co., a corporation, Respt., v. Anton Gresz, Frank
Gresz, and the State of North Dakota, doing business as State Land Depart-
ment, Defts., and State of North Dakota doing business as State Land De-
partment, Applt.
That the State of North Dakota may not be sued in its own courts with-
out its consent, but the state may lay aside its sovereignty and consent to be
sued on such terms and in such actions as it may prescribe.
That an action respecting the title to property, or arising upon contract
may be brought in the district court against the state the same as against
a private person. (sec. 8175 C. L. N. D. 1913).
That where in an action to foreclose a mechanic's lien, the state is made
a party under allegations seeking to determine the claim or right of the state
to the property involved; the action insofar as the state is concerned is one
respecting the title to property.
That the provision in section 8175, C. L. 1913, requiring the plaintiff, in an
action against the state, to file an undertaking for costs, does not make the
filing of an undertaking a condition precedent to the existence of a cause of
action against the state; and a complaint is not demurrable for failure to
allege the filing of such an undertaking.
Appeal from the District Court of -Billings County, Hon. H. L. Berry,
Judge.
AFFIRMED. Opinion of the Court by Morris, J.
In State of North Dakota on the relation of Alvin C. Strutz, Attorney
General, Applt., v. Sheridan County, a public corporation ,and J. P. Michal-
enko, John P. Dahl, and Thos. Brakel, as County Commissioners, and Ben F.
Kludt, as County Auditor of Sheridan County, Respts.
The charge made by the State against a county, pursuant to section 2568,
C. L. 1913; to section 1716al, 1925 Supplement to the 1913 C. L.; and to section
2588, 1925 Supplement to the 1913 C. L., as amended by chapter 251, Session
Laws 1929, as amended by chapter 246, Session Laws 1939, for the institu-
tional care of the insane, the feeble minded, and the tubercular, is a charge
for a general county purpose and must be included in the aggregate amount
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for which taxes are levied for general county purposes. Accordingly, the levy
for such charge for institutional case is subject, together with the levies for
other general county purposes, to the limitation of eight mills on the dollar
of the net taxable assessed valuation imposed by section 4a, of chapter 235,
Session Laws 1929.
Appeal from the District Court of Sheridan County, Hon. G. Grimson,
Judge, Proceeding in mandamus. From a judgment denying the writ, plain-
tiff appeals.
AFTIRMED. Opinion of the Court by Nuessle, Ch. J.
In Unemployment Compensation Division of the Workmen's Compensa-
zion Bureau, a Department of the State of -North Daokta, Applt., v. People's
Opinion Printing Company, a corporation, Respt.
That a non-compensated president of a corporation, whose acts are only
such as are required for maintaining the defendant as a corporation, as dis-
tinguished from those necessary to the management and conduct of its busi-
ness, is not to be treated as an employee for the purpose of determining
whether the corporation is liable for contributions under the North Dakota
Unemployment Compensation Act. (Chapter 232, Session Laws 1937, as
amended by Chapter 215, Session Laws 1939.)
That a suit to collect contributions under the North Dakota Unemploy-
ment Compensation Act is an action for the recovery of money. In the event
the defendant prevails, he is entitled to a judgment for taxable costs.
Appeal from the District Court of Barnes County, Hon. M. J. Englert,
Judge.
AFFIRMED.
Opinion of the Court by Morris, J.
In Unemployment Compensation Division of the Workmen's Compensa-
tion Bureau, a department of the State of North Dakota, Applt., v. Valker's
Greenhouses, Incorporated, a corporation, Respt.
That in determining whether an enterprise is to be exempted from the
payment of contributions to the North Dakota Unemployment Compensation
Fund upon the ground that employees are engaged in agricultural labor, the
conditions under which products are produced and labor employed must be
considered as well as the labor practices used.
That labor rendered in a greenhouse and on a tract of land cultivated in
connection therewith is not agricultural labor under the facts disclosed by
the record in this case, the greenhouse being primarily a commercial enter-
prise.
That the amendment of the Federal Social Security Act which brought
greenhouses definitely within the exemption applicable to employers of agri-
cultural labor is an amendment in substance and not merely a legislative
interpretation of the language used in the original enactment. It does not
control the interpretation of the North Dakota Unemployment Compensation
Act which was enacted prior to the Congressional amendment.
Appeal from the District Court of Burleigh County, Ron. R. G. McFar-
land, Judge.
REVERSED AND REMANDED.
Opinion of the Court by Morris, J.
